Voltage Glitching Unlocks Full A100 Capabilities on NVIDIA CMP 170HX Mining Cards
TL;DR
A voltage‑fault‑injection (VFI) exploit on the GA100 fuse controller can blow arbitrary fuseless fuses, unlocking all SMs, full HBM capacity, PCIe Gen4, NVLink and other datacenter features on a CMP 170HX mining card – effectively turning it into an A100‑80G that runs ~1.2× faster than a stock A100.
What was discovered?
- The GA100 die contains 16 384 eFuses organized into regular, fuseless (FF), IFF and RIR regions.
- "Fuseless" fuses encode option‑words that enable or disable major blocks (SMs, FBPs, NVLink, PCIe speed, etc.).
- Blowing an FF fuse does not physically erase a fuse; it writes a new 16‑bit block that overrides earlier values.
- By using VFI to force the fuse controller into a state where the
OPT_SECURED_BURN_FEATURE_ENABLE(SBFE) bit is cleared, the controller permits arbitrary FF writes. - After clearing SBFE, the attacker can write FF rows that set all
*_DISABLEoption words to zero (or to the defect‑mask), effectively "un‑floorsweeping" the die. - The result is a fully unlocked GA100 with up to 128 SMs, 80 GB usable HBM on the 8 GB CMP SKU, PCIe Gen4 x16, NVLink, ECC and MIG support.
GA100 fuse architecture in brief
| Region | Rows | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Regular fuses (0‑221) | Primary/redundant security and product‑segmentation bits. Blowing is permanent and cannot be undone. | |
| Fuseless fuses (FF, 222‑487) | Stores JTAG‑style records that map to option‑words. New records replace old ones, allowing software‑style reprogramming. | |
| IFF (487‑512) | On‑the‑fly reprogramming; not accessible on production cards. | |
| RIR (extra 8 rows) | Manufacturer‑defined repair instructions; largely unusable for unlock on the 8 GB SKU. |
The most valuable FF option‑words for unlocking are listed below (chain, block, bit ranges are inferred from reverse‑engineering):
| Option word | FF location | Effect |
|---|---|---|
NV_FUSE_OPT_FBIO_DISABLE |
Chain 1, bits 83‑106 | Disables framebuffer I/O partitions |
NV_FUSE_OPT_FBPA_DISABLE |
Chain 1, bits 107‑130 | Disables sub‑partitions within FBPs |
NV_FUSE_OPT_GPC_DISABLE |
Chain 1, bits 131‑138 | Disables whole GPCs |
NV_FUSE_OPT_TPC_GPC{i}_DISABLE |
Chain 1, bits 187+8i‑194+8i | Disables individual TPCs |
NV_FUSE_OPT_NVLINK_DISABLE |
Chain 1, bits 368‑370 | Turns NVLink off |
NV_FUSE_OPT_DISABLE_GEN3_SPEED |
Chain 2, block 39 | Limits PCIe to Gen3 |
NV_FUSE_OPT_PCIE_MAGIC_BITS_D[25] |
Chain 2, block 47, bit 3 | Disables PCIe Gen4 |
NV_FUSE_OPT_SYS_PIPE_DISABLE |
Chain 1, bits 372‑379 | Blocks MIG pipes |
Clearing these bits removes the floorsweep signals that power‑gate the corresponding blocks.
How voltage fault injection enables the unlock
- Glitch the PWMVID rail – an STM32‑G4 board monitors NVVDD and injects a short low‑voltage pulse into the VRM PWM control line (PWMVID) during power‑on.
- Trigger a “Goldilocks” state – after a few carefully timed pulses, the fuse controller boots with:
OPT_SECURED_BURN_FEATURE_ENABLE = 0DISABLE_SW_OVERRIDE = 0ENABLE_FUSE_PROGRAMstill at its fused value (1 after aSENSE_CTRLcommand).
- Shadow SBFE – with
DISABLE_SW_OVERRIDE = 0, the host can write to theOPT_SECURED_BURN_FEATURE_ENABLEregister, permanently setting SBFE to 0 and opening the fuse‑programming path. - Burn FF rows – the attacker writes new FF records that set every
*_DISABLEword to the minimum viable mask (defect‑only). The fuse controller accepts these writes because SBFE is cleared. - Finalize configuration – after the FF burn, the standard
cmpunlockerdriver patches remaining configuration registers (FBPA_CFG, SM_SPEED_SELECT, etc.) to expose the full framebuffer geometry and SM count.
The entire glitch campaign takes between 1 hour and 48 hours depending on hardware stability; each attempt consists of a power‑cycle, a timer‑driven PWM pulse, and a host‑side check of fuse‑controller registers.
Measured performance gains
| Metric | Retail A100 | Software‑only CMP 170HX unlock | Hardware‑unlocked CMP 170HX (VFI) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FP16 half2 FMA throughput | 72.488 TFLOP/s (1.00×) | 50.129 TFLOP/s (0.69×) | 85.861 TFLOP/s (1.18×) |
| SM count | 108 (yield‑limited) | 70 | 120‑128 (die‑lottery dependent) |
| PCIe generation | Gen4 x16 (datacenter SKU) | Gen2 (limited by FF) | Gen4 x16 |
| NVLink | Enabled | Disabled | Enabled after a tiny PCB bridge |
| Usable HBM | 80 GB (A100‑80G) | 64 GB (software only) | 80 GB |
The hardware‑unlocked card consistently outperforms a retail A100 in FP16 workloads, confirming that the extra SMs and higher memory bandwidth are functional.
Practical unlock steps (high‑level)
- Prepare the glitch board – flash the STM32 firmware (available in the
ga100vfirepo), solder wires to the PWMVID and NVVDD test points on the CMP PCB, and remove the 0402 0 Ω resistor that connects PWMVID to the VRM. - Run the glitch campaign – power‑cycle the card, let the STM32 detect the NVVDD threshold (≈225 mV), and deliver the three‑pulse waveform. Repeat until the controller reports
SBFE = 0andDISABLE_SW_OVERRIDE = 0. - Issue
SENSE_CTRL– this forces the controller to latch all regular fuse values while preserving the overriddenDISABLE_SW_OVERRIDE. - Shadow SBFE – write
0to theOPT_SECURED_BURN_FEATURE_ENABLEregister via the privileged fuse‑controller interface. - Burn FF rows – program the FF records that clear all
*_DISABLEbits (tailored per die based on defect masks). Thega100vfitool automates row calculation. - Apply software patches – run
cmpunlockerto adjust FBPA configuration, SM speed selection, and memory geometry. - Optional hardware mods – bridge the missing U11 pins on the PCB to enable NVLink; add a PCIe‑Gen4 decoupling capacitor if desired.
All scripts and detailed waveforms are in the public GitHub repository: https://github.com/kate-land/ga100vfi.
Community reaction (selected HN comments)
"amazing to think there was a time (literally not too long ago) where you would throw 80 GB of HBM onto a chip and turn 90 % of it off" – @htrp
"But what if NVIDIA used those fuses because an A100 had too many fabrication faults so it could only be a cheaper mining card?" – @amelius
"I’m actually trying to unlock the 80G in a CMP 170HX the software way for the last 2 weeks… seems a lot more risky" – @notenchange
"It's utterly crazy that anyone outside NVIDIA knows any of this…" – @mitxela
These comments highlight both the surprise at the economic rationale behind the segmentation and the perceived risk of hardware‑level fuse blowing.
Future research directions
- Security‑sensitive fuses – Some option‑words (e.g., debug‑HS execution, secure boot) remain blown in production; targeting them could expose deeper debug interfaces.
- Glitch‑state automation – Faster glitch campaigns using external PCIe risers or dedicated power‑sequencing rigs could reduce unlock time from hours to minutes.
- Cross‑SKU applicability – Extending the technique to other GA100‑based GPUs (e.g., Tesla P100, older A100 variants) may reveal similar unlock opportunities.
References
- Jon Pry, A Canary in the Crypto Mine (2026).
- Amogh Munikote, cmpunlocker (2026).
- Otto Bittner et al., The Forgotten Threat of Voltage Glitching (2021).
- NVIDIA, US9230678B2 – Enhanced fuseless fuse structure (2016).
- TSMC, TEF07F32X32HD18 fuse datasheet (2018).
- Kate Land, Using voltage glitching to unlock the A100 (2026) – full blog and source code.
Sources
Related
- Dispatch
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- Project
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