ASML 2026 Europe Sales Zero – Why the Lithography Giant Calls on the EU for Demand

ASML sold zero EUV tools to Europe in 2026, and it blames the lack of fab investment

ASML disclosed that its European revenue share fell to 0 % in the first two quarters of 2026, meaning the company sold absolutely nothing to chipmakers in the EU. The drop follows a gradual decline from 5 % of total revenue in 2024 to 1 % in 2025. The lithography monopoly’s executive vice‑president Frank Heemskerk warned that “Europe is not investing and because no chip factories are being built here.”

Europe’s fab pipeline is growing, but not fast enough for ASML’s high‑end tools

Intel’s Fab 34 in Ireland received a €5 billion expansion to produce Intel 4 and Intel 3 CPUs, but the investment targets mature process nodes that use older DUV tools, not ASML’s EUV scanners.
ESMC, a joint venture backed by TSMC, Bosch, Infineon and NXP, is building a €15 billion fab near Dresden for 12/16 nm FinFET and 22/28 nm planar chips—again, mature‑node equipment.
Infineon’s new Smart Power Fab in Dresden (€5 billion) focuses on power, analog and mixed‑signal devices, not leading‑edge logic.
GlobalFoundries is upgrading its Dresden Fab 1 for specialty nodes (22 nm FD‑SOI, eNVM, BCD) but these are not EUV‑requiring processes.

These projects increase European capacity, yet none are slated to use ASML’s EUV or upcoming High‑NA EUV scanners, which are the only tools that enable sub‑5 nm logic chips. Consequently, ASML’s most profitable product line has no immediate customers in the region.

Why EU subsidies haven’t translated into ASML sales

"Subsidies for fabs do not help." – Tom’s Hardware analysis

The EU’s Chips Act and national subsidies focus on building new fabs, but the funding often targets mature‑node facilities that already have sufficient tooling.
European regulatory environments—strict environmental rules, high energy costs, and complex permitting—increase the total cost of ownership for a cutting‑edge fab, discouraging investment in EUV‑based lines.
Even when advanced fabs are built (e.g., Intel’s Irish expansion), most of the silicon is shipped abroad for packaging, limiting the strategic value of a “Made‑in‑Europe” chip ecosystem.
Commenters on Hacker News noted that taxes and bureaucracy are driving manufacturers to locate elsewhere, and that EU‑wide market fragmentation makes coordinated demand creation difficult.

ASML’s plea to the EU: create a guaranteed market for European chips

Heemskerk argued that demand‑side policies are needed in addition to supply‑side subsidies. He suggested:

Aggregating and guaranteeing orders for EUV tools from European chip designers and manufacturers.
Coordinating with major EU customers (e.g., automotive, AI‑for‑industry) to commit to sourcing chips produced locally.
Leveraging EU political influence to align research funding, standards, and procurement policies around a European semiconductor value chain.

"We are also making an enormous effort, and we are talking with Ursula von der Leyen, saying: ‘try to harness the market power and dynamism that ultimately do exist in Europe.’" – Frank Heemskerk (panel at De Balie)

Community reactions: consensus and dissent

Commenter	Key Insight
theandrewbailey	Points out the statement is made mid‑year, so a full‑year zero is still a projection.
sputknick	Views the EU’s economic stance as deliberately regressive, blaming policy for the lack of fab construction.
viraptor	Provides context: the 2026 zero follows only two orders in 2024 and three in 2025, indicating a shrinking pipeline.
HPsquared	Highlights that European environmental and safety regulations slow fab builds, giving other regions a competitive edge.
rurban	Counters the “no sales” narrative by noting TSMC’s Dresden fab will use ASML equipment, though likely mature‑node tools.
pelorat	Argues that producing state‑of‑the‑art chips in Europe is borderline impossible due to cost, so existing fabs have no incentive to upgrade.
codefreakxff	Questions the logic of government subsidies for a private‑sector profit driver, suggesting price‑demand mismatch.
Sweepline	Observes that the rapid shift underscores how geopolitics can quickly reshape supply chains.
kiln_ash	Suggests the EU’s self‑sufficiency push collides with ASML’s global market reality.
bsoqk	Cites an EU audit concluding the bloc is unlikely to double its global chip share by 2030, implying policy failure.

Overall, the community agrees that regulatory friction, fragmented markets, and the high cost of EUV fab construction are the primary barriers, while a few note that some advanced equipment will still be sold (e.g., to TSMC’s Dresden fab) but not enough to affect the headline zero.

What the zero‑sales figure means for the semiconductor landscape

ASML’s revenue model is heavily weighted toward EUV and High‑NA EUV scanners, which command premium prices (hundreds of millions per unit). A 0 % European share translates to hundreds of millions of dollars in lost sales for 2026.
European chip sovereignty remains weak; without a domestic demand base, the EU cannot justify the massive capital outlays required for next‑generation fabs.
Global competition intensifies: the U.S. CHIPS Act, Taiwan’s aggressive fab expansion, and South Korea’s government‑backed projects are all advancing while Europe lags.
Policy implication: If the EU wishes to retain its semiconductor ecosystem, it must move beyond construction subsidies and create a binding demand framework—for example, through public‑private procurement contracts, guaranteed wafer‑volume commitments, or coordinated R&D roadmaps that tie EUV tool orders to specific European chip programs.

Bottom line

ASML’s declaration of zero European sales in 2026 is a stark indicator that Europe’s fab investment pipeline is misaligned with the company’s high‑end product portfolio. The lithography leader is now urging the EU to shift from merely funding fab construction to actively guaranteeing demand for advanced chips, a move that would be essential for revitalizing Europe’s semiconductor sovereignty.